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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
the Court had to dispose of two other arguments which had been advanced by
respondent but were not decided by the courts below. Respondent contends
that the initial telephone conversation between himself and petitioner had
"closed the deal" and that, therefore, he had made no contract to arbitrate the
present dispute. 30 Respondent further contended that even if a valid contract
to arbitrate existed, petitioner has waived his right to arbitrate by reason of
both laches and his (petitioner) participation in the proceedings before the
Department of Agriculture. The Court of Appeals felt that both issues present
questions of fact which should be resolved at a further hearing to be held at
Special Term. The judgment below is therefore reversed and the matter re-
manded to Special Term for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.
J.D.
PETITIONER, BY PARTICIPATING IN ARBITRATION PROCEEDINGS, WAIVES RIGHT
TO CLAIM THAT DISPUTE IS NOT ARBITRABLE
Petitioner, in National Cash Register Co. v. Wilson,8 ' had entered into a
collective bargaining agreement with respondent union, providing for, among
other things, seniority rights among the employees. The agreement also con-
tained a broad arbitration clause. Four years later, the union called an economic
strike, which was settled by two supplemental agreements, extending the orig-
inal collective bargaining agreement for one year and providing in essence that,
except for a ten day period immediately following the strike settlement, workers
were to be recalled in accordance with the seniority provisions of the existing
collective bargaining agreement. Respondent, alleging that petitioner had vio-
lated these supplemental agreements by not applying seniority rights among all
the employees-those who did not strike at all and those who had been recalled
during the ten day period-but only among those who were still out because
of the strike, sought arbitration pursuant to the arbitration clause in the original
collective bargaining agreement. Petitioner, although objecting to arbitration
on the ground that the dispute was not covered by the arbitration clause in
the original collective bargaining agreement, fully participated in all proceed-
ings. The arbitrators decided in favor of the union on the merits and petitioners
contend that the arbitration clause of the main contract does not extend to
disputes arising under the supplemental agreements. Although Special Term
vacated the award on the above ground, the Appellate Division reversed and
confirmed the award, holding that the arbitration clause applied to the supple-
mental agreements.82 The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division,
stating that the references in the original collective bargaining agreement to
"any supplements to it" must be read as intending to give the arbitrators
authority to pass on any dispute arising not only from the main agreement,
30. For a discussion of these issues, see student note on Matter of Exercycle Corp.
(Maratta), appearing p. 75 supra.
31. 8 N.Y.2d 377, 208 N.Y.S.2d 951 (1960).
32. 7 A.D.2d 550, 184 N.Y.S.2d 957 (3d Dep't 1959).
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but also from any supplement to it. Moreover, the Court held that petitioner,
by participating in the arbitration proceedings, had waived any right to contend
that the agreement did not provide for arbitration.
Section 1458 (1) of the Civil Practice Act clearly provides that an appli-
cant, after having participated in the arbitration proceedings, can only' chal-
lenge the award on certain enumerated grounds.33 He cannot, however, contend
that the dispute is not arbitrable. This appears to be based upon the proposi-
tion that once a party has ratified a contract, through his acceptance of its
provisions, he cannot thereafter claim that the contract does not exist or that
its provisions are invalid. Petitioner's motion to vacate, therefore, must be
limited to one of the grounds enumerated in Section 1462(1)-(4) of the Civil
Practice Act.84
Although Section 1462 (4) provides that an award may be vacated when
the arbitrators exceed their power, the Court holds that the latter objection is
applicable only where it can be said that the arbitrators have given "a com-
pletely irrational construction to the provisions in dispute and, in effect, made
a new contract for the parties." 35 The agreement in dispute, although suscep-
tible of different interpretations was reasonably interpreted by the arbitrators.
Therefore, it cannot be said that the arbitrators have exceeded their power
within the meaning of Section 1462 of the Civil Practice Act.
J. D.
ARBITRABLE IssuE PRESENT AS TO CONTENT AND MEANING OF GENERAL
RELEASE
On January 4, 1952, the parties, in Bronston v. Glassman,"6 entered into
a written agreement whereby respondent undertook and agreed to render cer-
tain personal managerial and related services to petitioner in return for com-
pensation. The agreement, which by its terms was to run to December 31,
1961, contained a broad arbitration clause. On May 29, 1959, a further agree-
ment 37 was entered into between the parties hereto, their wives and certain
corporations, which provided in essence for the exchange of general releases
33. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 1458(1):
A party who has participated in the selection of the arbitrators or in any of the
proceedings bad before them may object to the confirmation of the award only
on one or more of the grounds specified in subdivisions one, two, three and four
of section fourteen hundred sixty-two....
34. Subdivisions 1 through 4 of Section 1462 provide for the vacation of an arbitration
award only where it has been shown that there was: 1) fraud in procuring the award;
2) partiality or corruption of the arbitrators; 3) misconduct of arbitrators; 4) or that
arbitrators exceeded their powers.
35. National Cash Register v. Wilson, supra note 31 at 383, 208 N.Y.S.2d at 955.
36. 10 N.Y. 2d 158, 218 N.Y.S.2d 645 (1961).
37. The settlement agreement of May 29, 1959, contained the following provision:
Except for the rights and obligations contained in this agreement, all other claims
which any of the parties hereto may have against any other party hereto are
released and forgiven and each of the parties hereto will deliver to each other parties
hereto duly executed, standard form general releases excepting only rights under
this agreement. Bronston v. Glassman, 13 A.D.2d 486, 488, 212 N.Y.S.2d 239, 241
(Ist Dep't 1961).
